Abstract

This paper explores the outcomes of international state-building in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) following the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement, using the criteria of democratic governance, institutional functionality, and political legitimacy. While Dayton successfully halted a brutal conflict and ethnic violence by establishing a formal democratic framework, it simultaneously entrenched ethnic divisions, produced an inefficient and bloated state, and failed to build citizen trust in government. Consolidation of ethnic tensions, unfair and premature elections, ethnic quotas, election fraud, and extra-constitutional powers of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) have created a system that is democratic on paper but exclusionary and dysfunctional in practice. Meanwhile, institutional fragmentation and political gridlock have hindered service delivery and economic recovery while mass emigration and political apathy reflect the population’s disillusionment and the regime’s lack of legitimacy. Through the Bosnian case, the first and most ambitious post–Cold War state-building experiment, this paper reveals the limits of externally imposed democratization. It argues that sustainable peace and democratic resilience require not only institutional design but also inclusive participation, domestic accountability, and long-term legitimacy. The lessons of Dayton remain crucial in an era where liberal peacebuilding is under strain and international consensus has waned. 

Keywords: state-building, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dayton Agreement

Introduction

Post-conflict state building is an important act of political engineering and an exercise in moral authority with outsiders intervening to build up states that had collapsed under the weight of ethnic violence and civil war. It is arguably the most crucial aspect in maintaining and keeping peace as it works to dismantle the fragility of the past and build up new strong, accountable, equitable institutions that can maintain the security and development of the nation. It is a distinct phase of reconstruction where legitimate governmental institutions are provided with necessary instruments to provide both physical and economic security to its citizens. Understanding whether those interventions were effective and democratic is critical for evaluating the other international state building projects post-Cold war and understanding its mistakes allows future actors to analyze its unique scenario to apply these lessons.

What is the question?

The central question this paper explores is: to what extent has international state building resulted in a democratic, functional and legitimate state in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)? In other words, how have international actors designed and implemented the Dayton Peace Agreement at the end of the Bosnian conflict to effectively maintain peace and reconstruct stable governance when looked through the criteria of democracy, legitimacy, and functional strength? Many missions like this have aimed to transform fragile, divided societies into functioning liberal democracies, but the premise raises fundamental questions: can democracy be externally imposed? Are externally built institutions seen as legitimate by the populations they govern? Do these institutions possess the strength to last and adequately provide for the people?  

Why Bosnia?

Bosnia is examined in this paper because it represents the earliest and most ambitious attempt at liberal state-building in the post–Cold War era. It was the first major case in which the international community, operating under a unipolar world order, exercised sweeping authority not just to end war but to design a democratic state from above. The Dayton Peace Agreement created an unprecedented system of externally imposed peace, enforced by NATO troops and civilian administrators with far-reaching powers. Bosnia became a prototype, if not a laboratory, for how liberal peace could be engineered through a blend of military intervention and institutional reform. International officials in Bosnia held extraordinary roles, at times bypassing elected leaders and dictating policy, raising immediate and long-term questions about the legitimacy and democratic nature of such externally constructed systems. The case also brings to the forefront the dilemma of local participation: whether actors who had fueled or fought in the conflict could be reliable partners in democratic reconstruction, or whether their involvement merely entrenched existing divisions. Nearly three decades later, Bosnia still grapples with deep ethnic fragmentation, weak public institutions, and a public deeply disillusioned with its political order. The legacy of Dayton, and the broader liberal peacebuilding project it represents, continues to shape Bosnia’s governance. Studying Bosnia offers rare insight into both the possibilities and the deep limitations of externally driven democratization in fragile, post-conflict societies.

Who are the international actors involved?

The Dayton Peace Agreement of 1995 was brokered under intense U.S. leadership, with support from a broad coalition of international actors, including NATO, the UN, the EU, the OSCE, and numerous NGOs. These actors played complementary roles in securing peace, rebuilding institutions, and guiding Bosnia toward long-term stability. NATO led the military enforcement of Dayton, deploying a 60,000-strong Implementation Force (IFOR), later replaced by the Stabilization Force (SFOR). This mission, authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 1031, successfully enforced ceasefires, demilitarized former combatants, and deterred renewed violence. NATO’s mission was later transferred to the European Union in 2004 under Operation ALTHEA (EUFOR), though NATO retains a reduced presence through its Sarajevo headquarters and defense cooperation programs.¹ The United Nations facilitated civilian oversight through the establishment of the Office of the High Representative (OHR), a powerful civilian body responsible for overseeing Dayton’s implementation and endowed with so-called “Bonn Powers” to impose laws and remove obstructive officials.² UN agencies such as UNHCR and UNDP handled refugee returns, reconstruction, and humanitarian efforts, while the ICTY prosecuted war crimes. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) was tasked with democratization, especially electoral monitoring and political institution-building. OSCE organized the first postwar elections, deployed thousands of international monitors, and supported reforms in policing, media, and governance.³ The European Union played a central role in Bosnia’s postwar economic recovery and political transition. It became the largest financial donor, with over €1 billion in aid pledged through the 1990s, while also guiding Bosnia toward EU accession.⁴ The EU deployed civilian missions such as the EU Police Mission (EUPM) and later assumed military responsibilities from NATO. Politically, the EU tied reconstruction to reform: Bosnia entered Stabilisation and Association talks and in 2024 opened accession negotiations. Over time the EU has also supervised compliance with Dayton by conditioning aid and membership prospects on implementing reforms such as constitutional and police reforms, often in parallel with the OHR. The EU has been the largest single international donor and the central actor for Bosnia’s eventual Euro-Atlantic integration, while also taking over many of the civilian peace‐implementation tasks once run by the UN.

Collectively, these international actors transformed Bosnia into one of the most internationally supervised states in modern history. While their efforts brought peace and institutional development, they also entrenched a model of dependency and exposed the difficulties of externally driven state-building in a deeply divided society.

The Provisions of the Dayton Peace Agreement

The Dayton Peace Agreement (1995) established Bosnia and Herzegovina as a single sovereign state composed of two highly autonomous entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (itself subdivided into ten cantons) and Republika Srpska, with an additional multi-ethnic Brčko District under state jurisdiction.⁵ Its Constitution (Annex IV) created a decentralized, consociational framework aimed at balancing ethnic representation to prevent renewed conflict. Power resides in a tripartite Presidency (one Bosniak, one Croat, one Serb elected by their respective entities), supported by a bicameral Parliamentary Assembly that includes ethnic quotas in both the House of Peoples and House of Representatives, ensuring power-sharing across the constituent peoples.⁶ The central government retains limited competencies including foreign policy, monetary affairs, trade, immigration, and communications, while entities control most domestic functions. Judicial oversight is provided by a Constitutional Court composed of domestic and internationally appointed judges, explicitly empowered to adjudicate disputes over Dayton’s constitutional text and human rights compliance.⁷ The Dayton framework further incorporates the European Convention on Human Rights into the constitutional order, making it formally supreme law. Together, these provisions form a complex, multi-layered legal structure designed to secure peace through ethnic-parity governance, though they also embed structural divisions and limitations on national-level cohesion.

The Framework of Assessing International State-building

In order to properly assess the degree of success of state-building when implemented through international intervention with the example of Bosnia, this paper establishes the framework through three pillars, built around the central tenet that such a state must survive and function independently with the consent of trust of its people, that address distinct but interconnected aspects of a state. The criteria are democratic governance, effective institutions, and legitimacy in the administration. Democratic governance safeguards the fundamental rights of citizens and their inclusion in the political system,  effective institutions deliver adequate welfare services, protection, and security, and legitimacy ties the two by building public trust in the government and ensures accountability. These pillars are often interlinked as free elections (democratic participation) can boost public trust (legitimacy), while strong bureaucracies (institutions) support responsive governance.

Democratic Governance

According to the OSCE, it is defined as “a system of government where institutions function according to democratic processes and norms” where democracy is defined as power that’s vested in the people.⁸ Democratic governance is the principle that the citizens of a state are able to freely and meaningfully participate in its government through fair and open elections. No minority or ethnicity should be marginalized in this process as the people are able to build an equitable, diverse, and fully representative government that leaves no group unattended. The UN Mission in Timor-Leste established in 2006 to stabilize the nation from civil disorder affirms that “strong democratic institutions promote and integrate women and minorities in all levels of the Government and society as a whole”.⁹ Moreover, it furthers in detail that democratic governance includes “the separation of powers and independence of the branches of government; the exercise of power in accordance with the rule of law; the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; and, the transparency and accountability of a responsible civil service”. In other words, these key institutional features of a democracy are free and competitive elections where there’s ample space for opposition and media, majoritarian decision making in open legislatures, separation of power, and civil rights. Therefore, it is crucial for international actors in state building to ensure these factors are carried out completely to term.

Furthermore, a critical aspect of democratic state building is the emphasis on citizen engagement and the benefits it would bring. The World Bank notes that “meaningful…civic…engagement …can lead to better governance, citizen empowerment, more constructive citizen-state relations, strengthened public service delivery, and, ultimately, enhanced development effectiveness and well-being”.¹⁰ The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) concurs where its Governance and Peacebuilding Cluster aims to support “a robust and inclusive social contract which reflects people’s expectations and to strengthen the institutional capacity of state and non-state actors to meet them” through inclusive political processes. ¹¹ Sustainable governance mandates broad civic participation and inclusive politics, recognizing that citizens are not simply the passive recipients of state services but instead co-creators of the political order, especially in the fragile and post-conflict states. The act of engagement creates a positive feedback cycle of institutional responsiveness that’s gauged with social demands. The citizen-state relationship is crucial, which is why NATO commander Admiral Leighton Smith in post-war Bosnia has said, “The military side will be okay, but if the civilian side goes belly-up, the possibility of peace in here diminishes dramatically”.¹² Protections for civilians and guarantees for their freedom of political participation paves the way for reconstruction and the creation of a common, collective identity, fostering social cohesion.

Functional

Strong, functional institutions such as the civil service, security forces, courts, etc, are essential for a viable state. The World Bank emphasizes that capable, accountable institutions are critical to development and peace. Its governance practice aims to build “capable, efficient, resilient, sustainable, inclusive, and accountable institutions” so that governments can “effectively provide public goods… support an environment that can generate jobs and growth…address market failures and…engage citizens”, which in turn helps countries avoid conflict.¹³ In other words, delivery of services and rule of law is the backbone of state legitimacy and stability. In post-conflict settings, state services often collapse and the administration must be rebuilt. For example, after the 1999 crisis in East Timor, UNTAET inherited a complete institutional vacuum as 7,000 Indonesian officials fled . The UN and donors had to staff ministries, police, schools, and hospitals from scratch. A UNDP review notes that “large-scale international support was still necessary to ensure the provision of basic public services [and] capacity development of state institutions” as Timor moved to independence.¹⁴  

Legitimate

Legitimacy is at the core of stable political order. According to University of New South Wales Professor Srinjoy Bose, it is the “acceptance, however reluctant, of a governing regime deemed to have the capacity and entitlement to exercise authority”.¹⁵ A government perceived as legitimate by the governed population would face less opposition and require less coercion when upholding and executing its institutions. Moreover, the paper extends that legitimacy is a major factor in evaluating the variety in success of post-conflict state building case studies where the fragile context begins with little to no public trust in its leadership. Legitimacy is acquired by building trust and confidence across multiple parties which can be achieved through accountability and transparency. According to the OECD, accountability is “the relationship between the state and its citizens, on whose behalf a state…is expected to rule”.¹⁶ This takes form in transparency, where citizens have information about the decisions and commitments of the state and the extent of their success, answerability, where citizens can demand that the state answers and justifies its decisions, and enforceability, the ability of the population to sanction the state if it fails to meet expectations and previous agreements.

        Successful democratic governance often leads to legitimate and trusted governments. Such was the case study of UNMIT (UN Mission in Timor-Leste) where international intervention helped cultivate a thriving democracy after immense instability. According to the UN Secretary-General’s 2012 report, UNMIT helped ensure trustworthy and free electoral processes through technical assistance, civic education, and security coordination, resulting in peaceful and legitimate elections in both 2007 and 2012.¹⁷ The impacts of these measures last until today in its robust democracy, where a 2023 poll by the International Republican Institute found that 89% of respondents approved of the government, 86% of the National Parliament, and 96% of the President José Ramos-Horta.¹⁸ Such levels of approval indicate strong faith in democracy and overwhelming popular support for the nation’s democratic governance and direction.

The Framework in Practice

1. Democratic governance

Dayton, on paper, preserves many features of liberal democracy yet in practice undermines many core principles of democratic governance. The governing structure of the Dayton Agreement in Bosnia is partly democratic in that the provisions maintains regularly run elections with competitive party politics and the constitutions ensure the separation of power and certain inalienable rights but in practice is impeded by legal inequalities, widespread corruption and electoral fraud, the existence and extra constitutional actions of the UN Office of the High Representative, the consolidation of ethnic tensions, and the lack of a civil society with autonomous NGO social groups and media.

A Democracy on Paper

The electoral system, established under Dayton, by law holds periodic multi-party elections with international observers, and dozens of political parties contest every level of government. In municipalities and at entity and state levels, over a hundred political parties campaign candidates and voters primarily choose among ethnically Croat, Serb, Bosniak, and a few multiethnic or civic parties. These elections are not simply coronations of a single ruler but instead genuinely and competitively contested. Moreover, the Dayton constitution was successful in achieving a cornerstone of democracy, the separation of power. Annex 4 formally divides authority among branches, establishing a collective presidency and a Council of Ministers, marking the executive branch, two chambers of parliament, the legislative branch, and a constitutional court, the judiciary. Each branch has distinct responsibilities and roles with greater allocation of authority among entities and cantons with their individual legislatures and executives, albeit at the expense of weakening the central government. For example, Dayton provides ethnic representatives in both executive and legislative branches and allows judicial review, even though in practice the system is often gridlocked. Annex 4 grants “far-reaching ‘consociationalist institutions’ based on power-sharing, decentralisation, ethnic vetoes, and proportionality”.¹⁹ Consociationalism is a way of democratic governance to overcome deep ethnic, religious, or linguistic divisions in a nation in pursuit of stability.²⁰ In theory, this design respects separation of powers where authority is constitutionally divided and elected bodies exist at each level. The Constitution also guarantees civil liberties and human rights in a bill of rights, incorporating international human right conventions into Bosnian law, explicitly enshrining individual freedoms. Annex 4 contains dozens of references to human rights and requires Bosnia to adhere to European human-rights standards in freedoms of speech, religion, assembly and association, with the judiciary empowered to strike down laws that violate these rights. Moreover, the Dayton Accords reaffirmed Bosnia’s commitment to the International Criminal Tribunal, reflecting a formal preference for rule of law. The Dayton Constitution on paper enshrines robust civil liberties and equal rights to participate in politics and human-rights guarantees for its citizens while in practice is deeply flawed and undemocratic.

Consolidation of Ethnic Divisions

The Dayton constitution created an unusually complex democracy based on ethnic power-sharing. It enshrined a tripartite presidency, with a Bosniak, Serb and Croat member rotating in office, and a bicameral parliament with seats reserved by ethnicity. Instead of achieving multiethnic representation, these provisions cemented ethnic divisions and legal exclusion of non-constituent citizens. Hronesova points out that the Dayton constitution “anchor[ed] the power of ethno-national voices” in government, multiplying partisan platforms to pursue the same nationalist agendas that had fueled the war.²¹ A local NGO leader Azra Zornić put it bluntly: “Dayton put a straitjacket on us. … Our governmental structure is based on ethno-nationalism,” useful in 1995 but “completely dysfunctional” nearly thirty years later.²² Moreover, the tripartite presidency and the state’s highest offices are required to be reserved only from each of the three “constituent people”, effectively barring Jews, Roma, and other ethnicities that don’t fall under Bosniaks, Serbs, or Croats from running for the presidency or holding any top political positions. This legal discrimination has been repeatedly condemned, such as in 2009 when the European Court of Human Rights ruled to force Bosnia to amend its constitution to allow “others” to run for high office.  However, Bosnia’s political leaders have ignored the order, as “one thing the nationalists of all stripes can agree on is this barrier to political entry”.²³  In short, despite universal suffrage on paper, the Dayton rules codify ethnic voting and explicitly shut out “others” by ethnicity, violating democratic principles of equal political participation.

Premature Undemocratic 1996 General Elections

The institutionalization of nationalism and ethnic differences originates from the flawed foundations established by the first elections in September 1996 post-conflict. According to a 1997 report by the Human Rights Watch, the conditions in Bosnia only a year after the war were not yet ready or capable of free and fair elections as the majority of the population were unable to meaningfully participate in politics. Many individuals and refugees who were displaced by the war were unable to freely return to their homes, there was limited movement across territories, and the press and media were heavily divided along ethnic and political lines. Under conditions where citizens struggled for basic needs, very few could have the means and resources to make informed decisions about their representatives, a crucial aspect for successful elections. Moreover, what further entrenched ethno-nationalism in the first elections in Bosnia post-Dayton were the war criminals and leaders who “maintain[ed] predominant political and military control” instead of being indicted and punished. These were more often than not extremists who prioritized a nationalistic and ethnic agenda and were more intent on dividing the nation “into separate, ethnically pure states” rather than preserving a cohesive unity. The report furthers that “the international community, for its part, has failed to use the means at its disposal to force compliance”, putting “minority populations…at risk of abuse…ethnically and politically motivated killings, arbitrary arrest and detention, physical mistreatment and harassment of minorities”.²⁴ Furthermore, the 1996 elections were rushed and premature as a result of political pressure from the Clinton Administration in the United States. Despite advice from the OSCE that conditions in Bosnia were not yet ready for free and fair elections, the Clinton administration urged the nation into a general election for their domestic political agenda of proving international and American success in the Bosnian intervention. However, the exact opposite effect occurred as for two more years, the same nationalist parties “who fought the war for Tudjman and Milosevic” were voted into power, further entrenching ethnic division even after the violence. “The nationalists blocked reconciliation and integration, forcing revision of NATO exit dates and municipal election schedules, and delaying important decisions not made at Dayton”. These parties had no intentions of working together and instead pursued their own agendas, which uniquely conflicted one another, making any political collaboration immensely difficult.

Election Fraud

Since then these democratic mechanisms, although flawed, have mandated multi-party elections to be held regularly under OSCE supervision with opposition parties in all three ethnic blocs. However, the electorate’s decisions have often been limited by ethnic quotas and patronage. Independent monitors have documented pervasive clientelism, for instance, an OSCE election monitor noted that “every election, the same parties go to the villages, give the villagers 50 marks…and tell them to go vote for them…For 50 marks, people will do anything”.²⁵ 50 marks is equivalent to about 27 dollars, and when the national average hourly wage of a Bosnian worker is 6 marks, it’s clear how effective vote buying and prevalent electoral fraud is in the nation, despite international involvement and election monitors. However, for the international community and especially the United States, these elections continue to be seen as progress even if they were not perfectly free or fair. In practice, Bosnia’s promised free elections are repeatedly compromised by corruption, nepotism, and strong-arm tactics.

The Office of the High Representative

Under Dayton, Bosnia is subject to an internationally appointed High Representative with extraordinary, unchecked powers. The High Representative can amend laws, change the constitution, and remove elected officials, all unilaterally and without democratic and popular support. These so-called “Bonn powers” often undermine sovereignty and local accountability. For instance, in 2022, the High Representative Christian Schmidt amended and rewrote the electoral law of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the night of the general election after the votes had already been casted without any public input, prompting outrage and international scrutiny.²⁶ Schmidt implemented reforms to restructure the entity-level Federation’s House of Peoples, the upper house of the entity Parliament, right after polling places closed. Specifically, the most significant change was increasing the number of delegates in the chamber from 58 to 80, increasing the amount of representation of “Others” that aren’t the three main ethnicities.²⁷ This act, which bypassed both parliament and constitutional procedures, was condemned by both local and international actors as antithetical to the very democratic norms the OHR was meant to uphold. Nedim Ademović, expert and professor on Constitutional law says, “It’s not democratic to change rules pertaining to how the government is formed after the elections…it’s unfair to both the voters and political subject”.²⁸ European Parliament members Tineke Strik and Thomas Waitz also criticized the move, calling it “disrespectful” and “a slap in the face for the voters”. Although these changes were meant to “improve the functionality of institutions in the FBiH and enable all citizens to have their voice heard and be represented by those they elected”, it shattered the trust of other citizens and reflected that Bosnia’s democratic process will always be subordinated to an international overseer. This temporary position of seemingly preeminent power has over time allowed domestic leaders to often deflect responsibility. Thus, an unelected foreign official can override Bosnia’s own institutions, a situation fundamentally at odds with democratic self‑government.

Strong Civil Society

Finally, Bosnia lacks a strong, autonomous civil society that could hold the government to account. Dayton’s structure relegated citizens to the margins as the vast majority of policy-making occurs “behind the closed doors of ministries and the headquarters of political parties,” with NGOs and journalists having little influence.²⁹ Public input was largely excluded in framing Dayton and the practice continues to perpetuate itself in modern Bosnian politics where there’s little input from the civil sector in important policy decisions, especially pertaining to the social sphere. Independent media are heavily polarized along ethnic lines, and journalists who critique the system often face pressure. In practice, NGOs depend heavily on international donors and have struggled to build cross-ethnic coalitions. Civic protests such as the 2014 Bosnian Spring reflect the citizens’ desire to play a more active role in the country’s politics but such movements remain fragmented and easily undermined. Without a robust, impartial civil society or media sector, Dayton’s promises of democratic renewal remain hollow for many citizens.

In sum, the Dayton structure succeeded democratically by formally enshrining democracy: it provides for a tripartite presidency and a bicameral parliament, delineates separate executive and legislative branches at the state and entity levels, and incorporates a “bill of rights” enforcing fundamental freedoms. However, widespread academic consensus agrees that the power-sharing design in Dayton has outlived its peace-enforcement purpose. Key legislative decisions on budgets, reforms, or police forces, often require cross-ethnic supermajorities which are sometimes impossible to achieve. With party politics largely along ethnic lines, consensus on any issue is rare. Dayton failed to instill complete democratic governance by paralyzing governance through consolidating ethnic politics, legal exclusion of “others”, rushed and premature initial elections, widespread corruption and electoral fraud, the continued extra-constitutional power of the OHR, and the lack of a strong civil society.

2. Functionality in practice

The system in Bosnia established through the international peacebuilding of Bosnia proves to be dysfunctional due to its complex and burdensome provisions that established too many inefficient lawyers of governance, often causing legislative gridlock and preventing the passage of beneficial reforms. This, in turn, affects the government’s ability to adequately deliver public services to its citizens which would be examined through the systems of education, healthcare, and overall economic growth and employment in the nation.

The fundamental inefficiency within Bosnia’s governance is the fragmentation of its territory as services are deeply segmented across the nation. Administration over social welfare programs like healthcare and education are largely handled by canton governments rather than the federal government on a national level. There are multiple parallel systems, within both the Federation and the Republika Srpska. For example, there is a Ministry of Education for the state, each entity, and each of the ten cantons in the Federation.³⁰The ten cantons, Unsko-Sanski, Kanton Posavski, Tuzlanski, Zaničko-Dobojski, Bosansko-Podrinjski, Sredjnobosanski, Hercegovačko-Neretvanski, Zapadno- Hercegovačko and Kanton Sarajevoin, each has its own school curricula and healthcare administration. This inefficiency prevents progress as the AACRAO concludes that education reforms are hindered by the “the complexity of the governing structures, the redundancies of administration and resulting inefficient use of available funding, conflicting interests and goals of the main ethnic groups”. ³¹ In fact, the overall multi-layered system of governance forces the nation to have an overburdening complicated set of over 140 different ministries amongst its 13 semi-autonomous units as the weakness stems from the existence of only three central ministries. This level of decentralization and political complexity originates from the tense negotiations that resulted in Dayton to avoid conflict, which although were meant to be temporary, have not changed much despite numerous attempts at constitutional reform, which “effectively weakened the central state and produced imprecise vertical and horizontal divisions of competences”. ³²

Education

Independent Bosnia saw a surge in educational opportunities as literacy rates for citizens over the ages of 15 increased from 86% in 1991 to 95% in the early 21st century. However,  the expansion of educational institutions took place under the context of ethnically divided parallel school systems. Since each canton and entity possess their own ministry of education, each have their independent, biased curricula that emphasize ethnic narratives in Bosnia, intrinsically harmful to the nation as it creates “three separate sets of citizens, each unfamiliar with and distrustful of the others”. ³³ For example, children in a Croat area would learn croat-biased history and one in a Serb area would learn Serb-biased history, especially about the conflict just a few years before. The embedded bias in the system makes it inherently dysfunctional as the education fails to promote an enduring national unity but instead pitting students and future citizens against each other, making social cohesion difficult and a common identity almost impossible. The ethnic divisions, explored previously in the existence of democratic governance in the form of party politics, has its foundations deeply rooted in the parallel school systems as it shapes the nation’s population of tomorrow. Moreover, the ethnically-biased history taught in these schools is also unproductive from an objective perspective as it doesn’t provide an accurate account of what occurred. Bosnia’s issue extends to higher education as well, where as of 2023, only 45% of students who have completed secondary education chose to enroll in colleges and university, a number that is 35,000 fewer than a decade ago and has been consistently plummeting.³⁴ The higher education system, just like the rest of the nation, is incredibly decentralized and fragmented, suffering from limited funding from 13 different budgets across the nation which all lack accountability and a unified strategic plan for spending. Many universities lack international accreditation as foreign countries often refuse to recognize Bosnian diplomas due to concerns over the nation’s fragmentation and doubts on whether they meet uniform quality standards. Bosnia’s poor higher education environment, along with rising emigration especially among youths leading to a “brain drain”, explains for the massive drops in college enrollment in the nation. Education, especially higher education, is the foundation of the economy and society. When Bosnia’s education systems are so divided, fragmented, and ineffective, it’s much more difficult to build a collaborative and sustainable nation, especially after years of intense and violent conflict.

Healthcare

Healthcare, similar to the governance in Bosnia, is decentralized and illustrates the systemic inefficiency present. Each entity, and in the Federation each canton, runs its own health ministry. This means that uneven and inequitable access to healthcare is a common occurrence where wealthier, urban areas would cover costs that poorer regions cannot. The network is highly fragmented due to inadequate resource allocation. Working conditions in the public sector are poor with outdated equipment as there isn’t sufficient funds in the budget to invest in new ones. Public medical staff are often unmotivated as they are paid on a fixed salary regardless of the quality or quantity of care, leading many public employees to concurrently work in private industries, often referring patients to their own private practices.³⁵ The quality of public healthcare care is often perceived by the population as poor, with the staff being considered as highly unresponsive and with long waiting lists for certain services.³⁶ The poorly regulated private sector does not alleviate the issues with the public sector either. Geographical imbalances still persist with 158 registered private healthcare institutions in the canton of Tuzla but only 4 in the canton of Podrinje in 2010.³⁷ It operates as a separate entity, and although care and services are reported to be of higher quality, it lacks necessary regulations and is intensely profit driven. The net effect is that Bosnia’s citizens experience highly variable services depending on where they live, undermining the notion of a unified state.

The Economy

Based on the framework established, a key assessment of the functionality of a government is by the performance and health of its economy. In the case of Bosnia, economic recovery was slow and the macroeconomy remained fragile. The late 1990s brought a rapid transition of “shock therapy” privatization, often forming monopolies,  but it failed to revive industrial production. As Schaeffer observes, Dayton combined with neoliberal economic policies “left Bosnia in political limbo and trapped it in poverty” instead of the prosperity that was once promised.³⁸ The situation wasn’t ameliorated in the 2000s as Bosnia was faced with chronic stagnation. Unemployment rates remained the highest in Europe while youth unemployment was among the worst across the world, a symptom of labor market friction and a lack of foreign investment, reflecting labor market frictions and lack of investment.³⁹ About half of the Bosnian population lived on assistance or remittances where one in two young adults say they intend to leave the country because of poor life quality and a lack of opportunity.⁴⁰ Wages and public budgets stay low while the GDP growth barely outpaces population growth. A survey by EU officials describes Bosnia as “dysfunctional for its citizens, but not for its politicians”.⁴¹ Politicians in each ethnic bloc often control entire industries or public companies, leading to chronic corruption. For ordinary people, essential services are unreliable as frequent power outages and bureaucratic delays are reported. In fact, for children between the ages of 5 and 15, almost a third are below the absolute poverty line.⁴² Overall, the economy has been unable to provide jobs or services at a level that meets citizens’ expectations with only nationalist elites and politicians benefiting from the status quo.

Under the Dayton Agreement, maintaining peace and stability was the priority rather than efficiency. In exchange for an immediate end to all conflict, optimizing governmental institutions were sacrificed. However, this paper must also explore the merits in functionality of the agreement. Under the provisions, the clearest success achieved by the treaty was the obtainment and preservation of peace. Basic order has been maintained through a combination of Bosnian security forces and international peacekeepers such as the Implementation Force (IFOR) and the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) which were NATO-led multinational peacekeeping forces and the EUFOR Operation Althea of the EU. To sum, in terms of functionality, Dayton delivered a fragile stability but at the cost of a bloated, inefficient state. Its institutions struggle to provide coherent public services or foster growth, reinforcing popular dissatisfaction.

3. Legitimacy as trust

Legitimacy, the degree to which citizens accept and trust the state, has proven the hardest post-Dayton goal. On one hand, the state’s survival and monopoly on violence give it a degree of legitimacy that was lacking during the war. BiH’s constitution upholds individual rights and guarantees multiethnic citizenship in theory. Bosnia’s integration into international organizations as a UN member and EU candidate also provides external legitimacy. However, many Bosnians remain deeply disenchanted with the system, as evident through data on public trust in government, mass emigration and brain drain, inequality, and nationalist leaders undermining state unity, and voter participation.

Public Trust Data

Public confidence in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s institutions remains very low, reflecting deep-rooted disillusionment with the government. Multiple surveys have documented this sentiment, for example, a 2023 USAID/NSCP study found only about 8% of citizens trust political parties, just 11% have trust in the judiciary, and 36% are satisfied with local government services, percentages that had been steadily decreasing.⁴³ A report by BTI 2024 finds that Bosnia “is formally considered a democracy, but it effectively operates as a corrupt power-sharing ethnocracy with elements of state capture”, causing “trust in democratic and other public institutions [to have] consistently remained low”.⁴⁴ The report furthers that in the 2022 Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) Balkan Barometer which conducted surveys on public opinion in the six Western Balkan Countries, only 25% of citizens approved of the national government compared to the Balkan regional average of 40%.⁴⁵ Public perception of poor quality healthcare, divided and ineffective education, inadequate delivery of services, mass corruption and governmental inefficiency all feed into a pervasive sense of futility. Analysts observe that Bosnians often voice a social malaise that “nothing can be done” to change the system, reinforcing passivity and cynicism. These trust surveys underscore this deep and widespread unhappiness as Many Bosnians openly speak of Dayton as an impediment to normal life. Psychologist Bojan Šošić wonders “‘Is it moral to perpetuate the illusion that a good life is possible here? Would it be better to leave things alone and let them fail fast on their own?’” as he questioned whether trying to build a functioning civil society is itself ubleha, a Bosnian term for something empty, false and hypocritical.

Mass Emigration, Brain Drain

A major manifestation of low trust in the government is the trend of mass emigration from the country. Bosnia’s population has fallen from 4 million in 1991 to about only 3.3 million today, largely due to immigration during the war and people who never returned after Dayton. For example, according to the UNHCR in 2004, it is estimated that around 1 million of Bosnian refugees have returned while half a million are still displaced in neighboring countries and another half settling abroad.⁴⁶ However, emigration out of the country has been increasing, especially among young people. A UNFPA (UN Populations Fund) survey in November 2021 reported that 47% of Bosnians aged 18–29 are considering moving abroad, with 4%, roughly 23,000 people, having already taken concrete steps to emigrate and doing so within the next 12 months.⁴⁷ In this survey, young people ultimately cite social and economic inequalities as the major reason as many struggle with high youth unemployment, unfavorable economic conditions, lack of quality public services, and an unfriendly environment for personal and professional development. According to Alanna Armitage, UNFPA Regional Director for Eastern Europe and Central Asia, youth immigration is generally a good thing but “ young people shouldn’t feel they have to leave their own country because of lack of opportunities at home”.⁴⁸ More than 70% of these youths harbor deep distrust toward public institutions, maintaining that society is systemically corrupt. Mass youth emigration reflects a larger, more worrisome problem of “brain drain” where the nation loses an estimated a quarter to half of its educated and skilled young citizens in the next few decades.⁴⁹ Brain drain has devastating impacts as losing valuable individuals decreases taxation and consumer spending, darkening the nation’s economic future. Mass emigration affects the entirety of society, as it is projected to reduce the population under 1.6 million by 2070, exacerbating the current low birth rates and accelerating demographic aging.⁵⁰ Such immense population exodus and flight reflects a profound loss of faith in Bosnian institutions and the low legitimacy the government possesses. If citizens do not believe in the government to improve and reform the nation for the future, they will likely try to leave and establish a family abroad. This explains for the lack of strong and successful organized protests or civic activism as dissatisfied citizens simply choose to leave rather than collectively push for change.

Inequality

Inequality and ethnic discrimination further erode legitimacy. Bosnia’s governance framework explicitly limits certain rights for minorities: for instance, Jews, Roma and “others” are still barred from running for the tripartite presidency. The EU and human-rights bodies note that “political discrimination” against Serbs, Croats, and smaller minorities remains unaddressed. These institutional biases translate into fractured identities. A 2013 UN survey found over 90% of Bosniaks expressed pride in BiH citizenship, but only ~60% of Croats and 46% of Serbs did so.⁵¹ In fact, this distrust towards the government can be reflected in a mutual common distrust between different peoples in the nation. According to a 2019 European Values Study (EVS) in Bosnia, an alarming 90.6% of citizens expressed caution in dealing with people, reflecting a prevalent sense of social distrust. The study also found that Bosnian citizens exhibit the lowest levels of trust in individuals from a different ethnicity, 5.7%, or religion, 5.9%, than their own.⁵² Social distrust stems from poor governance and results in a lack of faith in the democratic government which is inevitably a representation of its citizens. If individuals don’t trust their different neighbors, how could they trust the leaders that represent them? Moreover, this chasm in state allegiance is compounded by economic inequalities. Though per-capita GDP has grown, around 13–17% of people still live below the poverty line, and vulnerability remains high with 40% living on income each month.⁵³ The COVID-19 pandemic worsened these divides: UNICEF/UNDP reported it increased poverty and food insecurity and “worsened social and economic inequalities” among already disadvantaged groups.⁵⁴ Taken together, ethnic grievances and material hardship mean many citizens, especially minorities and the poor, distrust the state’s willingness or capacity to protect their rights and welfare.

Ethnic Nationalism

Major political leaders regularly undermine state unity. For example, the Bosnian Serb president Milorad Dodik has openly challenged the central government by organizing referendums aimed at dismantling Dayton’s institutions in RS. His rhetoric of “republika srpska secedes” and actions such as planning a new RS army explicitly reject Bosnia’s constitutional order. Similarly, Bosnian Croat leaders have periodically complained that Dayton’s system marginalizes them, filing cases in Strasbourg courts arguing that their community is under-represented. There’s no legitimacy in a government that constantly struggles over power and is ripping itself apart.

Poor Electoral Turnout

The legitimacy crisis is also reflected in Bosnia’s poor electoral participation. Turnout in national elections has been low by regional standards, only about 51–55% in the last two general elections, indicating general apathy among the public. Even when voting, citizens often believe entrenched elites and ethnic quotas negate the impact of their ballots. Consistent with this, only about one-third of adults express interest in politics, and satisfaction with elected officials is incredibly low. Essentially, the combination of minimal electoral engagement and poor governance means many Bosnians do not see the democratic process as legitimate or effective.

        To sum, Dayton has failed to build a legitimate government that’s trusted by its citizens. Not only is this trend illustrated through the mass amount of data and surveys on public opinion, it’s reflected in the mass amounts of individuals fleeing the nation disillusioned by the future of its institutions. Different people in the nation are deeply divided, many have lost faith in politics or the prospect of democratic progress, all the while as ethnic nationalist leaders continue to dismantle the stable order.

 

Conclusion

In conclusion, while the Dayton Peace Agreement succeeded in halting violence and preserving security , the constitutional framework it enshrined has entrenched a government that is deeply undemocratic, inefficient, and widely viewed as illegitimate by its citizens. Though Dayton secured a peaceful end to a gruesome conflict, a monumental accomplishment, it did so by freezing ethnic divisions into a rigid political structure that now obstructs the very democratic and developmental aspirations it purported to establish. What was supposed to be a short term solution to a brutal war has continued for two decades, becoming a “synonym for inertia, neglect and despair”.⁵⁵

Democratic governance has functioned in form, not substance. Elections are held and rights are codified, but real political pluralism is taken hostage by entrenched ethnic parties, widespread corruption, and the continued presence of the UN Office of the High Representative, whose extralegal interventions undermine local accountability and sovereignty. Competitive elections only occur under a rigid framework that prioritizes group identity over policy innovation and genuine reforms. Without a strong civil society and independent media, there is little public and civic input into the nation’s decisions. While Dayton nominally provides the nation with regular elections, separation of power, and civil liberties, it’s not a robust democracy but instead a ethnocracy constrained by vetoes and foreign oversight that make legislation difficult to pass.

Likewise, from the functionality standpoint, Bosnia’s post-Dayton institutions have managed to provide basic services like education and healthcare, but they are systemically divided and perpetuate inequality. The overbuilt and fragmented bureaucracy, comprising 14 layers of government, over 180 ministers, and countless overlapping jurisdictions, has led to institutional redundancy, poor quality services, and budgetary inefficiency. The state performs, but only barely acceptable at an immense cost all the while the economy suffers from record high unemployment and stagnation.

The most fundamental failure, however, lies in legitimacy. The public trust that makes democratic governance meaningful has dangerously eroded. Surveys consistently show low public confidence in courts, political parties, and government institutions. Young people in particular are disengaged, with many choosing to emigrate and flee the country rather than attempt to reform the system. Brain drain, low electoral turnout, widespread corruption, and the normalization of ethnic hatred all point to a population that sees little value in engaging with the existing political order. Identity fractures further deepen the crisis as trust across ethnic lines is almost nonexistent, and the dominant political actors routinely appeal to ethno-nationalist rhetoric rather than state unity. A government that lacks both the consent of its citizens and their belief in its efficacy cannot be considered truly legitimate.

The failure to fully democratize or legitimize governance under Dayton raises deeper questions about the sustainability of externally imposed state-building. In fact, the implications of Bosnia’s experience stretch far beyond the Balkans. Today, the global context that made Dayton possible has unraveled. The unipolar moment has faded as Russia and China now challenge Western norms, faith in liberal democracy has declined worldwide and domestic dysfunction in countries like the U.S. has weakened the credibility of democratic promotion abroad. The “international community” is no longer unified or confident in its mission. If Dayton represents the apex of 1990s-era peacebuilding, it also illustrates its blind spots: an overconfidence in external engineering, a reliance on rigid institutional frameworks, and a neglect of the deeper social and political fabrics that give democracy life.  Moreover, it forces reflection on how international statebuilding of today must adapt to the changing landscapes and learn from Dayton’s failures.  The peace it produced remains cold, and the government it birthed risks collapse under the weight of its own contradictions.

Lessons Learned

From this, several core lessons emerge. First, democratic legitimacy is not a byproduct, it is the foundation of sustainable peace. Without trust, participation, and meaningful representation, institutions lack credibility and citizens disengage. Second, ethnic power-sharing, while effective in ending violence, must be reformed. Institutionalizing ethnic identity can entrench divisions and foster undemocratic outcomes, as Bosnia’s paralyzed governance shows. Third, international intervention can enable, but not substitute for, domestic political will. No foreign presence, however powerful or well-intentioned, can manufacture civic trust or inspire democratic culture. Efforts to build states from the outside must be humble, adaptive, and deeply grounded in local realities.

Finally, the most urgent lesson may be that peace agreements are not endpoints starting but instead lines. Dayton was never meant to be permanent, but over time it hardened into orthodoxy. In a region still haunted by the memory of war, many leaders used the agreement’s rigidity to shield themselves from accountability and to entrench their own power. The tragedy is not that Dayton failed to end violence, it succeeded in that. The tragedy is that it made the very politics that fueled the war the blueprint for postwar governance.

Today, Bosnia and Herzegovina stands at a precarious crossroads. The peace it enjoys is real but brittle, and the system that sustains it is neither trusted, democratic, nor functional. For Dayton to evolve from a peace settlement into a democratic foundation, it must be reimagined. not simply preserved. And for the international community, Bosnia remains both a warning and a call. Peace without legitimacy is not truly peace, and a state without democracy cannot hold.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank his research mentor Dr. Othon Anastasakis for his invaluable insights and guidance in the development of the research paper. His teachings, feedback, and suggestions were critical to shaping the direction of the research, especially his expertise in the Balkan region. The author would also like to thank the Cambridge Center for International Research for the research opportunity and their crucial assistance along the way.

Bibliography

Aacrao.org. “Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 2025. https://www.aacrao.org/edge/country/bosnia-and-herzegovina.

Bassuener, Kurt. “The EU’s Humiliating Failure in Bosnia.” Carnegieendowment.org, 2021. https://carnegieendowment.org/europe/strategic-europe/2021/11/the-eus-humiliating-failure-in-bosnia?lang=en.

Beecroft, Robert M. “Implementing Dayton: A Look Back.” Afsa.org, 2025. https://afsa.org/implementing-dayton-look-back.

Bieber, Florian. “CROAT SELF-GOVERNMENT in BOSNIA - a CHALLENGE for DAYTON?,” 2001. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/34186/brief\_5.pdf.

Borger, Julian. “Bosnia​’S Bitter, Flawed Peace Deal​,​ 20 Years On.” the Guardian. The Guardian, November 25, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/global/2015/nov/10/bosnia-bitter-flawed-peace-deal-dayton-agreement-20-years-on.

Bose, Srinjoy. “Legitimacy in Statebuilding.” Springer EBooks, January 1, 2021, 1–10. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74336-3\_79-1.

“Bosnia and Herzegovina .” World Bank, n.d. https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/d5f32ef28464d01f195827b7e020a3e8-0500022021/related/mpo-bih.pdf.

Bowman, Steven R. “Bosnia Stabilization Force (SFOR) and U.S. Policy.” www.everycrsreport.com, September 1, 1998. https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/97-475.html.

Brezar, Aleksandar. “Bosnia’s Peace Envoy Changed Laws Mid-Election. But What Does It Mean?” euronews, October 7, 2022. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2022/10/07/bosnias-peace-envoy-changed-laws-mid-election-but-what-does-it-mean.

BTI. “Bosnia and Herzegovina Country Report.” BTI Project, n.d. https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/BIH.

Frowick, Robert. “The OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 1996. https://ifsh.de/file-CORE/documents/yearbook/english/95\_96/Frowick.pdf.

Hronesova, Jessie. “A Flawed Recipe for How to End a War and Build a State: 20 Years since the Dayton Agreement.” EUROPP, December 14, 2015. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2015/12/14/a-flawed-recipe-for-how-to-end-a-war-and-build-a-state-20-years-since-the-dayton-agreement/.

Human Rights Watch. “Bosnia-Hercegovina: A Failure in the Making: Human Rights and the Dayton Agreement,” June 1996. https://www.hrw.org/legacy/summaries/s.bosnia966.html.

Icoski, Marjan . “Toward a New Youth Brain-Drain Paradigm in the Western Balkans.” GMFUS, 2022. https://www.gmfus.org/news/toward-new-youth-brain-drain-paradigm-western-balkans.

International Republican Institute. “IRI Timor-Leste Poll Shows Majority Believe in Country’s Direction, Support for Political Inclusion, Faith in Democracy,” May 4, 2023. https://www.iri.org/news/iri-timor-leste-poll-shows-majority-believe-in-countrys-direction-support-for-political-inclusion-faith-in-democracy/.

Malcolm, Noel R. “Bosnia and Herzegovina - Government and Society.” Encyclopedia Britannica, December 30, 2025. https://www.britannica.com/place/Bosnia-and-Herzegovina/Government-and-society.

Nakamura, Toshi. “United Nations Development Programme Oslo Governance Centre the Democratic Governance Fellowship Programme Reflections on the State Institution-Building Support in Timor-Leste Capacity Development, Integrating Mission, and Financial Challenges,” 2004. https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/publications/Building-Support-Timor-Leste.pdf.

“National Survey of Citizens’ Perceptions in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2023 Final Report.” USAID, 2024. https://measurebih.com/uimages/2023-NSCP-BiH-Report-508.pdf.

OECD. “DAC Guidelines and Reference Series Accountability and Democratic Governance Orientations and Principles for Development,” 2014. https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2014/09/accountability-and-democratic-governance\_g1g220a4/9789264183636-en.pdf.

OHR. “Annex 4 – Office of the High Representative,” 2026. https://www.ohr.int/dayton-peace-agreement/annex-4.

OSCE. “Democratic Governance,” September 5, 2025. https://www.osce.org/odihr/democratic-governance.

Papić, Žarko, Maida Fetahagić, and Sarajevo. “‘Towards the European Union -Key Social Inclusion Issues in BiH,’” 2019. https://www.sif.ba/dok/1564063775.pdf.

Philipp, Jennifer. “A Short Guide to Higher Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina - the Borgen Project.” The Borgen Project, February 7, 2025. https://borgenproject.org/higher-education-in-bosnia-and-herzegovina/.

Prljaca, Majda. “Citing Poor Life Quality, Almost Half of Young People in Bosnia and Herzegovina Ponder Emigration, UNFPA Survey Finds.” UNFPA EECA, November 16, 2021. https://eeca.unfpa.org/en/news/citing-poor-life-quality-almost-half-young-people-bosnia-and-herzegovina-ponder-emigration.

Saurugger, Sabine. “Consociationalism | Government | Britannica.” In Encyclopædia Britannica, 2020. https://www.britannica.com/topic/consociationalism.

Schaeffer, Carol. “How the West Failed Bosnia.” www.thenation.com, December 27, 2022. https://www.thenation.com/article/world/bosnia-herzegovina-dayton-accords/.

Sladojević, Nikolina, Nejla Nanić, and Kerim Mašović. “T ?,” December 2021. https://humanityinaction.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/21\_hiabih\_nato\_Winning-the-brains-back-How-can-Bosnia-and-Herzegovina-be-more-attractive-in-the-race-for-its-own-talent.pdf.

Slipicevic, Osman, and Adisa Malicbegovic. “Public and Private Sector in the Health Care System of the Federation Bosnia and Herzegovina: Policy and Strategy.” Materia Socio Medica 24, no. 1 (2012): 54. https://doi.org/10.5455/msm.2012.24.54-57.

UN. Secretary-General. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (for the Period from 7 January 2012 through 20 September 2012).” UN Security Council, October 15, 2012. https://www.refworld.org/reference/countryrep/unsc/2012/en/90230.

“United Nations Development Programme Building Inclusive Societies and Sustaining Peace through Democratic Governance and Conflict Prevention an Integrated Approach.” United Nations Development Programme, n.d. https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/publications/UNDP-GOVERNANCE%20AND%20PEACEBUILDING\_final.pdf.

UNMIT. “Democratic Governance,” March 14, 2017. https://unmit.unmissions.org/democratic-governance.

Watson, Fiona M., and Tom Dodd. “The Dayton Agreement: Progress in Implementation.” International Affairs and Defence Section House of Commons Library, July 9, 1996. https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/RP96-80/RP96-80.pdf.

World Bank. “Citizen Engagement.” World Bank, April 10, 2023. https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/citizen-engagement.

———. “Overview.” World Bank, 2018. https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/overview.

Zdeb, Aleksandra. “A Federation like No Other: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina.” 50 Shades of Federalism, March 5, 2018. http://50shadesoffederalism.com/case-studies/federation-like-no-case-bosnia-herzegovina/.

Footnotes

1. Steven R, Bowman, 1998. “Bosnia Stabilization Force (SFOR) and U.S. Policy.” Www.everycrsreport.com. September 1, 1998. https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/97-475.html. ↩

2. Robert M Beecroft, Afsa.org. “Implementing Dayton: A Look Back,” 2025. https://afsa.org/implementing-dayton-look-back ↩

3. Robert Frowick. “The OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina” https://ifsh.de/file-CORE/documents/yearbook/english/95_96/Frowick.pdf ↩

4. Fiona M Watson, Tom Dodd “The Dayton Agreement: Progress in I Mplementation,” 1996. https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/RP96-80/RP96-80.pdf ↩

5. Florian Bieber. 2001. “CROAT SELF-GOVERNMENT in BOSNIA - a CHALLENGE for DAYTON?” https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/34186/brief_5.pdf. ↩

6. Aleksandra Zdeb. “A Federation like No Other: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina - 50 Shades of Federalism.” 50 Shades of Federalism, March 5, 2018. http://50shadesoffederalism.com/case-studies/federation-like-no-case-bosnia-herzegovina/. ‌ ↩

7. Ohr.int. “Annex 4 – Office of the High Representative,” 2015. https://www.ohr.int/dayton-peace-agreement/annex-4/. ↩

8. Osce.org. “Democratic Governance,” 2025. https://www.osce.org/odihr/democratic-governance ↩

9. UNMIT. “Democratic Governance,” March 14, 2017. https://unmit.unmissions.org/democratic-governance ↩

10. World Bank. “Citizen Engagement,” 2025. https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/citizen-engagement. ↩

11. “United Nations Development Programme Building Inclusive Societies and Sustaining Peace through Democratic Governance and Conflict Prevention an Integrated Approach,” n.d. https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/publications/UNDP-GOVERNANCE%20AND%20PEACEBUILDING_final.pdf. ↩

12. “Bosnia-Hercegovina: A Failure in the Making: Human Rights and the Dayton Agreement,” Human Rights Watch, Vol. 8, No. 8 (D), June 1996 ↩

13. World Bank. “Overview,” 2024. https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/overview ↩

14. “United Nations Development Programme Oslo Governance Centre the Democratic Governance Fellowship Programme Reflections on the State Institution-Building Support in Timor-Leste Capacity Development, Integrating Mission, and Financial Challenges,” 2004. https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/publications/Building-Support-Timor-Leste.pdf ↩

15. Srinjoy Bose. “Legitimacy in Statebuilding.” Springer EBooks, January 1, 2021, 1–10. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74336-3\_79-1. ↩

16. “DAC Guidelines and Reference Series Accountability and Democratic Governance Orientations and Principles for Development,” n.d. https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2014/09/accountability-and-democratic-governance\_g1g220a4/9789264183636-en.pdf. ↩

17. United Nations Secretary-General. (2012). Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (for the period from 7 January through 20 September 2012). United Nations Security Council, S/2012/765. https://www.refworld.org/reference/countryrep/unsc/2012/en/90230 ↩

18. “IRI Timor-Leste Poll Shows Majority Believe in Country’s Direction, Support for Political Inclusion, Faith in Democracy.” 2023. International Republican Institute. May 4, 2023. https://www.iri.org/news/iri-timor-leste-poll-shows-majority-believe-in-countrys-direction-support-for-political-inclusion-faith-in-democracy/. ↩

19. Jessie Hronesova, “A Flawed Recipe for How to End a War and Build a State: 20 Years since the Dayton Agreement – EUROPP,” EUROPP - European Politics and Policy, December 14, 2015, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2015/12/14/a-flawed-recipe-for-how-to-end-a-war-and-build-a-state-20-years-since-the-dayton-agreement/ ↩

20. Sabine Saurugger. “Consociationalism | Definition, Examples & Benefits.” Encyclopedia Britannica, April 2013. https://www.britannica.com/topic/consociationalism ↩

21. Jessie Hronesova, “A Flawed Recipe”, 2015. ↩

22. Carol Schaeffer, “How the West Failed Bosnia.” The Nation, December 27, 2022. https://www.thenation.com/article/world/bosnia-herzegovina-dayton-accords/ ↩

23. Julian Borger, “Bosnia​’s Bitter, Flawed Peace Deal​,​ 20 Years On,” The Guardian, November 10, 2015, . https://www.theguardian.com/global/2015/nov/10/bosnia-bitter-flawed-peace-deal-dayton-agreement-20-years-on ↩

24. “Bosnia-Hercegovina: A Failure in the Making: Human Rights and the Dayton Agreement,” Human Rights Watch, Vol. 8, No. 8 (D), June 1996 ↩

25. Carol Schaeffer, “How the West Failed Bosnia”, 2022. ↩

26. ibid ↩

27. Aleksandar Brezar. “Bosnia’s Peace Envoy Changed Laws Mid-Election. But What Does It Mean?” euronews. Euronews.com, October 7, 2022. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2022/10/07/bosnias-peace-envoy-changed-laws-mid-election-but-what-does-it-mean.‌ ↩

28. Ibid ↩

29. Jessie Hronesova, “A Flawed Recipe”, 2015. ↩

30. Aacrao.org. “Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 2025. https://www.aacrao.org/edge/country/bosnia-and-herzegovina. ↩

31. Ibid ↩

32. Jessie Hronesova, “A Flawed Recipe”, 2015. ↩

33. Noel R Malcolm, and Paula Pickering. “Bosnia and Herzegovina | Facts, Geography, History, & Maps.” Encyclopedia Britannica, July 26, 1999. https://www.britannica.com/place/Bosnia-and-Herzegovina/Government-and-society. ↩

34. Jennifer Philipp, “A Short Guide to Higher Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina - the Borgen Project.” The Borgen Project, February 7, 2025. https://borgenproject.org/higher-education-in-bosnia-and-herzegovina/#:~:text=To%20summarize%2C%20decentralized%20education%2C%20limited,education%20in%20Bosnia%20and%20Herzegovina. ↩

35. Slipicevic O, Malicbegovic A. Public and private sector in the health care system of the Federation bosnia and herzegovina: policy and strategy. Mater Sociomed. 2012;24(1):54-7. doi: 10.5455/msm.2012.24.54-57. PMID: 23678309; PMCID: PMC3633389. ↩

36. ibid ↩

37. ibid ↩

38. Carol Schaeffer, “How the West Failed Bosnia”, 2022. ↩

39. Julian Borger, “Bosnia​’s Bitter, Flawed Peace Deal​,​ 20 Years On”, 2015. ↩

40. UNFPA EECA. “Citing Poor Life Quality, Almost Half of Young People in Bosnia and Herzegovina Ponder Emigration, UNFPA Survey Finds,” 2021. https://eeca.unfpa.org/en/news/citing-poor-life-quality-almost-half-young-people-bosnia-and-herzegovina-ponder-emigration. ↩

41. Kurt Bassuener,“The EU’s Humiliating Failure in Bosnia,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 2021. https://carnegieendowment.org/europe/strategic-europe/2021/11/the-eus-humiliating-failure-in-bosnia?lang=en. ↩

42. Papić, Žarko, Maida Fetahagić, and Sarajevo. “‘Towards the European Union -Key Social Inclusion Issues in BiH,’” 2019. https://www.sif.ba/dok/1564063775.pdf. ↩

43. “MONITORING and EVALUATION SUPPORT ACTIVITY II (MEASURE II) National Survey of Citizens’ Perceptions in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2023 Final Report,” 2024. https://measurebih.com/uimages/2023-NSCP-BiH-Report-508.pdf. ↩

44. BTI 2024. “BTI 2024 Bosnia and Herzegovina Country Report,” 2024. https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/BIH ↩

45. ibid ↩

46. Humanity in Action Winning the Brains Back: How Can Bosnia And Herzegovina be more attractive in the race for its own talent? humanityinaction.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/21_hiabih_nato_Winning-the-brains-back-How-can-Bosnia-and-Herzegovina-be-more-attractive-in-the-race-for-its-own-talent.pdf. Accessed 12 June 2025. ↩

47. UNFPA EECA. “Citing Poor Life Quality,” 2021 ↩

48. ibid ↩

49. GMFUS. “Toward a New Youth Brain-Drain Paradigm in the Western Balkans,” 2022. https://www.gmfus.org/news/toward-new-youth-brain-drain-paradigm-western-balkans. ↩

50. UNFPA EECA. “Citing Poor Life Quality,” 2021 ↩

51. BTI 2024. “BTI 2024 Bosnia and Herzegovina Country Report,” 2024. https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/BIH ↩

52. ibid ↩

53. World Bank ​​“BOSNIA and HERZEGOVINA.” https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/d5f32ef28464d01f195827b7e020a3e8-0500022021/related/mpo-bih.pdf. ↩

54. Human Rights Watch. “World Report 2023: Rights Trends in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 2023. ↩

55. Julian Borger, “Bosnia​’s Bitter, Flawed Peace Deal​,​ 20 Years On”, 2015. ↩